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Abstract 
Despite the considerable attention that has been devoted to the issue of government 
innovation policy and the effectiveness or otherwise of different policy measures, no 
attempt has yet been made to analyze how firms respond to such measures. In this 
paper we argue that such an analysis is essential both for a proper assessment of 
the values of alternative policy measures and for a proper understanding of how 
they might be most effectively implemented. Because there is in general a difference 
between the rhetoric of a firm’s response to government initiatives and the 
actuality of that response, we argue that the response can in general be analyzed 
only by historical investigation. Drawing on a substantial historical case study of 
Government sponsorship of the early British computer industry we draw some 
tentative and preliminary conclusions on a range of innovation policy issues, and 
argue the need for further analysis of this kind, and for a much closer attention to 
the problems of implementation in the framing of policy initiatives. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the end of the Second World War, 
government in Britain, as elsewhere, has 
devoted substantial funding to measures 
designed to encourage the successful 
commercial exploitation of new tech- 
nologies by industry. At the forefront of 
this operation have been organizations 
such as the National Research Development 
Corporation, the National Enterprise Board, 
and their joint successor the British 
Technology Group. But government has 
also sponsored a range of individual 
projects such as the Advanced Computer 
Techniques Project, the Pre-Production 
Order Scheme, the Product and Process 
Development Scheme, the Micro-electronics 
Support Programme, the Machine tool 
Industry Scheme and the Alvey Programme 
in information technology. Further funds 
have been channelled directly through the 
Ministry of Technology in the 1960s and 
the Department of Trade and Industry in 
the 1980s. And a considerable portion of 
defence procurement spending has also 
been directed towards the funding of 
commercially applicable innovations. 
The principal aim of these various 
measures has been to assist the establish- 
ment of an internationally competitive 
national industry in areas of major 
technological change, by overcoming a 
range of perceived problems and barriers 
to innovation within industry itself. 
Although the existence of such problems 
has always been generally accepted, 
however, there is no clear consensus as to 
what precisely they are, or how they arise. 
In an analysis of the reports of the 
Advisory Council for Applied Research and 
Development in the late 197Os, Rothwell 
and Zegveld identified a wide variety of 
perceived problems including, among other 
things: a low emphasis on engineering 
skills and inadequate recognition of 
engineers, as compared with scientists; a 
concentration on glamorous high- tech 
projects at the expense of more mundane 
but economically more relevant areas of 
innovation; a lack of rapport between 
manufacturers of process machinery and 
their users; a shortage of venture capital 
for new technology projects, especially at 
the pre-prototype development stage; an 
absence of profit levels sufficient to 
finance and encourage risk taking; a 
concentration on short- term returns and 
short-term financial criteria for invest- 
ment; over-manning due to Trade Union 
pressures; burdensome government 
bureaucracy and legislation, for example on 
health and safety; and poor coordination 
between the private and public sectors.’ 
Other problems commonly cited include the 
featherbedding of industry by defence 
spending, and the effect of defence 
contracts in encouraging esoteric and non- 
commercial designs;* the discouragement of 
investment by government fiscal policies;3 
a shortage of technically trained people in 
senior management positions;’ poor 
relationships between firms and univer- 
sitie$ low job mobility between industry, 
the universities, and government agencies 
and establishments;* and the relative 
weakness of the profit motive in British 
national culture.7 
Given this bewildering array of candidate 
problems, and given an almost total lack 
of consensus on which if any are key 
problems and which are not in fact 
problems at all, the selection of an 
appropriate policy measure is far from 
straightforward. Over the years successive 
governments have in fact tried a wide 
variety of different measures, including 
R&D subsidies, product launching aid, 
directed procurement, trial user schemes, 
joint industry-university research 
initiatives, user education programmes, new 
venture set-ups, patent pooling, and 
industrial reorganization. 
The question is, do any of them work, and 
if so which? The answer is, simply, that 
we do not know. There have been 
attempts made to assess the relative 
effectiveness of different policy instru- 
ments, both through econometric analysis 
and through more qualitative comparisons, 
but these have been both limited in scope 
and inconclusive.6 The extreme specificity 
of many of the measures, and of the 
situations in which they are applied, makes 
valid general comparisons virtually 
impossible. There have been studies of 
individual measures such as launching aid: 
but whether this serves to encourage 
successful innovation as intended or merely 
attracts second-best projects, the firms 
funding worthwhile ventures themselves, 
remains an open question.” 
There is not even a consensus as to 
whether the measures used have, as a 
whole, had any material effect, let alone 
as to whether or not they have been cost- 
effective.‘O If we ask whether they have 
succeeded in their primary task of 
establishing internationally competitive 
national industries, the answer must surely 
be no. But that is not to say that the 
situation might not have been even worse 
without them. The effects may simply have 
been neutralised by those of similar 
measures adopted by international 
competitors. If Pollard is right in his 
argument that the whole of British post- 
war economic policy has’ been imbued 
with the values of conservatism and with a 
distrust of, or even a contempt for, 
commercial innovation and investment, the 
measures designed to encourage innovation 
may even have been neutralised by their 
interaction with other aspects of 
government policy.‘l 
In summary, it would appear that we 
cannot easily assess the effectiveness of 
innovation policy measures, either 
individually or as a whole, in terms of 
their overall economic results. There is no 
reason, however, why we should not 
pursue another line of attack and 
investigate their immediate consequences, 
in terms of how individual firms have 
responded to the measures. Indeed, we may 
go further than this. Since the immediate 
aim of innovation policy measures is to 
influence firms’ behaviours, any proper 
evaluation of the merits of these measures 
w surely take account of how firms 
resoond, or may at least be expected to 
respond, to them, in the particular 
environment and circumstances concerned. 
Such an approach does not, of course, 
have the generality of an economic or 
econometric analysis. But it does have 
several important advantages. In particular 
it allows us, in principle at least, to 
distinguish between the effects of the 
policy measures themselves and any other 
environmental or political effects with 
which they might interact. It also allows 
and indeed forces us to distinguish 
between the policy measures themselves 
and the mode of their implementation. 
Though automatically recognized as 
important in any analysis of corporate 
policy, this distinction is rarely made in 
the context of government policy. Yet in 
any analysis of the effects of government 
policy it is how the policies are 
implemented, and not how they are 
formulated, that is of crucial importance. 
2. Polkv imnlementation and firm 
resnonse 
Remarkable as it may seem, this question 
of how firms respond to specific 
innovation policy measures has never been 
directly addressed within the policy 
literature. The general presumption appears 
to be that the passage from a policy’s 
formulation by government to its 
implementation in industry is not in itself 
problematic. The firm’s response is taken 
for granted and taken, moreover, at face 
value. It takes very little reflection to 
realize, however, that the apparent 
response of a firm may be very different 
from its real response, and that the latter 
may well differ significantly from what 
was envisaged by the policy-makers. 
To give just one example of the latter 
point, Dosi has observed that European 
government policies for the microelect- 
ronics sector have in general been based 
on the assumption that corporate 
strategies are broadly speaking consistent 
with public policy objectives.12 In 
practice, however, as he notes, this is far 
from being the case. Indeed the 
theoretical justification of government 
sponsorship is based partly on a well 
established difference between the social 
and private rates of return from an 
innovation, and on the argument that 
while the former is of interest to 
government as representative of the 
community as a whole, it is the latter 
which provides the basis for corporate 
decision making. ls Even if this difference 
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were to be removed, the company board 
room and government agency would still be 
characterised by different cultures, 
different experiences, different priorities 
and different perceived constraints, leading 
to different and incommensurable 
rationalities. 
These differences are also reflected in the 
difference between a firms public, or 
rhetorical response to government 
measures, and its private or actual 
response. A firm’s public response may be 
expressed in the language and context of 
government concerns, and phrased in such 
a way as to imply conformity of private 
and public objectives. But the private 
response will be conceived in the language 
and context of the board room, and will 
indeed be designed explicitly to cope with 
the difference between private and public 
objectives. 
This difference takes on a particular 
significance where the public policy rests 
on some form of coordination or 
cooperation, things which can be readily 
created in form without necessarily having 
any reality in substance. Most policy 
measures do in fact incorporate some form 
of collaboration - between firms, in pre- 
competitive research, between firms and 
government establishments or universities, 
between different government agencies, 
etcetera - but neither the theoretical form 
of this collaboration nor the rhetoric of 
those involved in it is necessarily any 
guide as to what is taking place at a 
substantive level. The rhetoric will be 
guided by a desire to maximize both 
friends and funding. The practice is more 
likely to be dictated by the internally 
established aims and priorities of the 
organization in question. 
All this points strongly to the need to 
probe beyond the rhetoric of firms’ 
responses to innovation policy measures 
and investigate what effects these 
measures actually have on the firms’ 
business strategies. The problem is, of 
course, that it is not in the firms’ 
interests to reveal this: if there is a gap 
between the rhetoric and actuality of .a 
firm’s response there must also be good 
reasons for concealing this gap. This 
means that the investigation cannot easily 
be carried out in real time. It can, 
however, be carried out historically, once 
the issues which dictated the rhetoric 
cease to be of importance or concern, and 
this is the approach we propose to adopt 
here. 
3. The case stuk 
An understanding of this subject sufficient 
to provide a basis for future policy and 
implementation decisions would of course 
require a massive programme of historical 
research, and this is a task for the future. 
Our aim here is to demonstrate the 
feasibility and value of the approach by 
outlining some of the conclusions from a 
detailed historical study recently carried 
out of the interaction between the 
National Research Development Corpora- 
tion, or NRDC, and the infant British 
computer industry, in the formative period 
for that industry of the 1950s.” 
The technology of computers is one of the 
most important of the post-war new tech- 
nologies, and many would argue that it is 
the most important. Its establishment as a 
technology with commercially feasible 
applications owed a lot to British scientific 
and technological inventiveness. As with 
so many other new technologies, however, 
British industry was slow to exploit it and 
soon lost out to foreign (in this case 
American) competition, failing to establish 
an internationally competitive domestic 
industry. In these respects computer 
technology provides something of a 
paradigm for new technologies in general. 
What makes it even more interesting from 
our present perspective is that the failure 
was achieved despite a determined and 
committed programme of government 
assistance. The birth of computer 
technology coincided with the birth of the 
NRDC, charged specifically with assisting 
the commercial exploitation of new 
technologies. The first managing director 
of the NRDC, Lord Halsbury, had a strong 
personal interest in computers, and was 
from the beginning totally committed to 
the establishment of a British computer 
industry able to compete internationally 
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and, in particular, with the American giant 
IBM. For ten years he tried everything he 
could to bring this about, and for ten 
years the activities of the NRDC were 
dominated by computer technology. 
The experiences of the NRDC and the 
early British computer industry are not of 
course universally applicable. They were 
conditioned in particular by the terms of 
reference of the NRDC in the period 
concerned, and by the historical social and 
economic context of that period; by 
management styles that may now seem 
dated, and by a specific industrial 
structure, both nationally and internation- 
ally. They did not cover the full range of 
policy instruments. Against this, however, 
the main instruments used were of a type 
that has remained central to British 
innovation policy. Many of the problems 
encountered were generic to both new 
technology industries and British industrial 
culture. And the historical evidence 
available is unusually good, allowing us to 
probe more deeply into our subject, with 
more subtlety and greater sureness, than is 
generally the case.ls 
4. Observations 
4.1 “PushinP mules uDhil1” 
From the practical viewpoint of implemen- 
tation, the basic problem for government 
technology sponsorship, and indeed for 
industrial sponsorship in general, is that 
the firms involved do not generally want 
to do what government wants them to. If 
they did, there would be no need for 
sponsorship. This means that in order for 
sponsorship to succeed it must serve to 
change the thinking and behaviour of the 
sponsored firms. If it cannot do this it 
will result only in rhetorical accommoda- 
tion, and will effectively be wasted. 
To what extent, then, does sponsorship 
actually effect corporate strategy? In a 
study of the French government’s 
sponsorship of the microelectronics 
industry, Dosi has made two important 
observations.ls First, he : suggested that 
the government policy as’ enacted came 
about as a consequence of a stalemate 
. . 
between the original publics ‘.polic’y . . . 
objectives and the objectives of,the firms ;G 
concerned, together with a 1. further ,” 
stalemate between the objectiv&+%f c’ 
different firms. The firms responded to 
government in their own terms, not in the 
terms of government. Secondly, when the 
government established a new firm, CII, as 
a joint subsidiary of two existing firms, 
CGE and Thomson, these firms treated it 
as an unwanted child to be sent to the 
orphanage, in Dosi’s analogy, as soon as 
possible. Similarly SESCOM, set up as a 
joint venture between Thomson and the 
government, was for many years kept alive 
by repeated injections of public funds, 
with little or no commitment from 
Thomson. If a firm does not want to do 
something - if that something is 
incompatible with its own, privately 
developed, corporate strategy - then 
government money will make little real 
difference. There is little to be gained 
from the sponsorship of unwilling firms. 
Both these observations find strong 
support in our case history of the British 
computer industry, and through this case 
history we can also see some of the 
processes underlying them at work. 
Already conscious of the threat posed by 
IBM, one of the NRDC’s principal aims in 
the early 1950s was to push the British 
punched-card machinery companies, British 
Tabulating Machines (BTM) and Powers- 
Samas, to move rapidly into computers. 
They were of course convinced that this 
was in the national interest, but they were 
also convinced that it was in the interests 
of the individual firms as well. Inevitably, 
however, the NRDC’s view of a firm’s 
interests was very different from the 
firm’s view of its own interests. Whereas 
the NRDC sought major changes that 
would pave the way for long term 
competitiveness, the firms sought merely 
survival in the short term. Unable to 
comprehend the importance of the 
technical changes that were taking place, 
the firms’ directors responded by 
discounting those changes from their 
calculations - by assuming that the only 
changes that could take place were those 
they could understand. In the case of 
Powers-Samas, this view was reinforced by 
the corporate strategy of its major 
shareholder, Vickers, for whom the 
company was a useful source of revenue 
which helped utilise Vickers’ own excess 
manufacturing capacity - not the basis of 
a radical new industrial departure. To try 
and change these attitudes was, to use 
Halsbury’s own analogy, “like trying to 
push mules uphill”. 
The firms’ responses were not, however, 
simply blinkered. At the time both had 
what seemed to them more important 
things to worry about. BTM had just 
broken their traditional ties with IBM and 
were embarking on a crash programme of 
expansion of their customer base so as to 
meet anticipated competition from IBM in 
respect of their existing product lines. 
Powers-Samas had also just broken away 
from their American partner (Remington 
Rand), and were desperately trying to 
consolidate after a run of difficult years 
that had all but drained the company’s 
resources. Neither firm felt able to divert 
scarce resources from what might well 
prove to be a battle for survival into 
speculative long-term developments. The 
courses advocated by the NRDC would 
have involved considerable risks in the 
short term, and to rate the importance of 
short term survival highly was not at all 
unreasonable. So the problem was not 
simply one of the NRDC being right and 
the firms wrong. Rather it was one of 
conflicting rationalities. The firms 
responded to any NRDC suggestion in their 
own terms, and the only way the 
suggestions could have had any significant 
impact would have been if the NRDC had 
accepted and worked within those terms. 
Similarly with the electronics companies, 
Ferranti and EMI, who were the two major 
recipients of NRDC development and 
launching aid in the period. Repeatedly in 
its dealings with Ferranti the NRDC 
bemoaned the fact that Sir Vincent de 
Ferranti, the chairman, insisted on seeing 
things in his own, to them very 
idiosyncratic, way. But this was natural 
and right. Sir Vincent controlled the 
company and was personally responsible 
for it, and any response to the NRDC had 
to be formed in, and was bound to be 
conditioned by, this context. In the case 
of EMI, the NRDC came away with the 
impression that there had been a meeting 
of minds and that EMI were responding in 
the full spirit of the NRDC proposals. In 
fact, however, that impression was illusory. 
EMI too responded in their own terms. It 
so happened that the NRDC proposals 
fitted in with their view of things, but 
they did not fit in in the way the NRDC 
thought they did, Although EMI appeared 
as a firm to be the most willing of 
partners, they actually had little interest 
in carrying through the projects as the 
NRDC wished, and the sponsorship given 
them made no difference to this basic 
fact. Despite the rhetoric the company 
WE3 never really behind the NRDC 
sponsored projects, and this was clearly 
reflected in their outcomes, one project 
leading to a computer design of which just 
4 were sold, and the other being 
abandoned altogether. This is not to say 
that the company were in any way 
dishonest in their dealings with the NRDC, 
merely that the aims of the two 
organizations were different, and that 
when difficult decisions had to be made 
within the firm their own aims naturally 
dominated. 
Similar situations also arose with other 
firms. In the first ten years of the 
development of the British computer 
industry the NRDC sponsored half a dozen 
major projects and many minor ones, and 
sought unsuccessfully to set up many more. 
But at no time did the aid given or 
offered to any firm make any perceptible 
difference to that firm’s business strategy. 
4.2 HeiDinP to no advantaa 
Besides the general inappropriateness of 
the policy measures to their own strategic 
aims, another factor dominating the firms 
responses to the NRDC and contributing to 
that body’s lack of real influence was that 
the amount of aid under offer was never 
seen as sufficient to supply the firms with 
a worthwhile competitive edge. This 
reflected of course on the NRDC’s specific 
terms of reference and on the limited 
sources of finance at their disposal. But it 
was also a reflection of something deeper 
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and more pervasive in British innovation 
policy. For while the avowed aim of the 
NRDC was to provide the British computer 
industry with a competitive advantage over 
its international rivals, a dominant 
principle of the implementation of that 
policy was that no one British firm should 
be given any competitive advantage over 
another. 
Our study of the implementation of the 
NRDC’s policies revealed a chronic 
obsession, apparently derived from 
established defence procurement practices, 
with fairness. Nothing was to be done 
which might in any way give, or be 
perceived as giving, any “unfair advantage” 
to a firm. When one of the computer firms 
WaS offered a development loan the 
repayment terms offered were generally 
rather different from those that would 
have been offered by a commercial lender. 
Typically, the NRDC would take on some 
part of the risk of the project failing, and 
seek a proportionate reward if it were to 
succeed. But overall the terms were little 
less onerous financially, and rather more 
onerous in other respects, than if the loan 
had been made commercially. Nor were any 
other benefits permitted to accrue to the 
firm, for example through preferential 
licenses or guaranteed government 
purchases of the ensuing products. 
Again, assistance was offered for 
technological developments, or even for 
products very closely identified with such 
developments, but not for any product 
developments of which the technology was 
only a part. There was usually a condition 
on the firms that no privately owned 
inventions should be exploited at the 
expense of publicly owned ones. And when 
an invention was singled out for publicly- 
funded exploitation care was always taken 
to ensure that neither the inventor nor 
the exploiting firm should profit too much 
thereby. When, occasionally, grants were 
offered, or loans on favourable terms, they 
had to be available to every firm able to 
meet some appropriate technical criterion. 
A similar insistence on fairness to that 
observed in the case study would appear 
to general feature of innovation policies in 
Britain, and it is all very laudable in its 
way. The problem is that it virtually 
eliminates any chance of the policies being 
successful. For given that the aim of 
sponsorship is to establish a commercially 
successful firm or firms where otherwise 
there would be none, the most appropriate 
recipient of government assistance is 
precisely that firm able to make the 
greatest commercial success out of it, or 
most likely, in other words, to secure 
what might be interpreted as an unfair 
advantage. If a sponsored firm does not 
secure such an advantage then, to put it 
bluntly, the policy has failed. 
Moreover, if a policy is to result in a firm 
securing an advantage where previously it 
had none, it must put in something of real 
competitive value. In the great majority of 
the instances detailed in the case study, 
the firms accepted the NRDC’s assistance 
because it was offered, or more usually 
pressed on them, because it gave them 
some access to information on what their 
competitors were doing, and because it 
established them in a favourable light, or 
so they hoped, in government circles. Had 
they believed that the developments 
concerned would have given them a 
competitive advantage they could and 
would have funded them commercially. As 
Vincent de Ferranti exclaimed at one point 
in response to an NRDC proposal: “I can 
get better terms from the bank!” 
4.3 Threats and ormortunities 
We mentioned earlier the general failure of 
the NRDC to persuade the punched-card 
firms to go into computer development in 
the early 195Os, when this did not tie in 
with the firms own strategic objectives. It 
is interesting to note, however, that there 
was one way in which the NRDC was able 
to influence the behaviour of these firms, 
and that this was not by offering them 
grants or subsidies at all, but by offering 
these to other firms. BTM, with a clear 
corporate view of their competitive 
environment, could not at first be 
persuaded to develop computers, and ti 
was only when the NRDC threatened to 
take their sponsorship elsewhere that they 
responded even in rhetoric. And only when 
NRDC sponsorship of the electronics firms 
Ferranti and Elliot Brothers brought home 
to BTM the possibility of new competitors 
entering their field of business did they 
actually instigate a serious, albeit small, 
computer development programme. 
To offer a large firm a small amount of 
assistance to act in a certain way actually 
changes very little in terms of that firm’s 
perception of its competitive environment 
and possible strategies. To tell the firm 
that it may have serious competitors if it 
does not act as required may produce a 
rhetorical response, but actually changes 
nothing and so leads to nothing. But 
sponsoring a competitor, even though it 
may do little for the competitor’s own 
position, does change the perceived 
competitive environment of the original 
firm, and so encourages a reassessment of 
strategy. 
A similar conclusion may be drawn from 
an analysis of the process by which the 
computer industry was restructured in the 
late 1950s and 196Os, a process that was 
also covered in the case study. From the 
early 1950s the NRDC view was that a 
competitive British industry could only be 
created, in the end, by a process of 
restructuring involving mergers between 
firms in the office machinery and 
electronics sectors. It was apparent to 
them, as well as to outside commentators, 
that such mergers offered tremendous 
opportunities for the firms concerned. 
When the industry did restructure, however 
- there were seven major mergers or 
takeovers from 1958 to 1968 - it was in 
response to threats, not opportunities. 
Each and every acquisition was defensive, 
both on the part of the buyer and on that 
of the seller. 
These observations are moreover supported 
by recent work on the cognitive elements 
of strategic decision making. In particular, 
Dutton and Jackson have analyzed the 
differences in decision makers’ responses 
to stimuli, depending on whether these are 
categorized as threats or opportunities.” 
And they have concluded, among other 
things, that situations perceived as threats 
lead to significantly greater responses than 
those perceived as opportunities. Threats 
are more powerful than promises. 
How far this argument can be taken in a 
policy setting is not clear. Whether one 
could sustain a policy of sponsoring the 
firms in which one wasn’t interested in 
order to shift the behaviour of those one 
was must be doubtful. But the argument 
does provide some support for a policy of 
sponsoring new firms and new ventures, 
some of which will perhaps thrive and 
grow while others merely spur established 
firms into action. And the general point 
that many firms will only respond 
defensively, and that government policy 
should take account of this, is surely a 
significant one. 
5. Conclusions 
The conclusions that can be drawn from a 
single case study are necessarily of a 
preliminary and tentative nature. Some 
general conclusions do however suggest 
themselves: 
Conclusion 1. The implementation of 
specific public policy 
measures is unlikely, in 
general, to have any 
significant effect upon the 
strategic thinking of the 
firms concerned. It may 
therefore be necessary for 
government to match its 
policies to existing 
corporate strategies, 
rather than attempting the 
reverse process. 
Conclusion 2. To the extent that firms 
will adapt their strategies 
to policy measures, they 
are more likely to respond 
defensively, to threats, 
than aggressively, to 
opportunities. It would 
therefore make sense for 
government policies to 
play on their defensive 
instincts, than to rely on 
aggressive instincts they 
patently do not have. 
Conclusion 3. Innovation policy 
measures are only likely 
to have any significant 
effect if they convey to 
the firms concerned a 
significant competitive 
advantage. This suggests 
that notions of fairness 
may have to be 
abandoned, and assistance 
directed towards those 
firms best able to 
capitalize on it, even if 
other firms suffer as a 
result. The name of the 
game should be “back the 
winner”. 
One final conclusion, more tentative still 
but of considerable interest, concerns the 
role of small firms. Innovation policy 
measures in Britain have generally been 
focused predominantly upon large 
established firms, for the fairly obvious 
reason that such firms are the best placed 
to succeed in an international market 
place. Our study provides clear support, 
however, for a contrary argument. Specific 
policy measures are likely to have a much 
greater effect upon the achievements of 
small firms, for whom a relatively small 
amount of assistance may make quite a 
large difference to their funding or 
resource base, than upon those of larger 
firms. The small firms are more likely to 
respond aggressively to innovation 
opportunities. Their strategies are more 
likely to be in line with the policy aims. 
The small firms themselves may not grow 
quickly into major players in the 
international market. But their existence 
as both potential competitors and potential 
acquisitions will encourage and help the 
larger firms to make the necessary moves 
into the new technologies when their own 
strategic plans make this desirable. And 
the stronger the small firms are, the 
faster this restructuring is likely to take 
place. 
Following a major study of the develop- 
ment of corporate life-cycles, Mintzberg 
has recently proposed that instead of 
assisting old and established firms, 
government policy should be aimed at 
killing them off and encouraging the young 
ones.18 The first part of this prescription 
may be too radical to be of any practical 
value, but by the very act of supporting 
the young firms we might at least 
persuade the older ones to have blood 
transfusions. 
Conclusion 4. Government sponsorship of 
innovation should be 
directed at small firms as 
well as large, and unless 
there is good evidence to 
the effect that a large 
firm will make use of the 
sponsorship in the spirit 
in which it is intended, 
the presumption should 
always be in favour of 
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